What you share stays between your devices
How UniConn keeps your copies, files, camera and screen to you, and, just as plainly, what it does not promise yet.
Only your devices, and only once you allow them
Every device signs in to your UniConn account, and two devices connect only if both are on it. Being on the account is not enough to be trusted: a new device becomes one of yours only when you tap Allow on a device you already have.
Before that tap, both screens show the same code, derived from a Noise handshake between the two devices themselves. You check they match. Someone in the middle cannot make them match, and neither can our server: it can tell your devices who is on the account, but it can never make a device trusted.
A third device joins with no tap because a device you allowed vouches for it, and only for the exact key the account also lists. Scanning a QR code in person still works, between devices on one account. The handshake's keys and the code are never written to disk.
A lost device is shut out
Each device checks in with UniConn about once a day while it is online. One that goes 7 days without checking in is paused by your other devices: they stop talking to it, even on the same Wi-Fi, and it asks you to sign in again. If UniConn itself can't be reached, your devices go on working together for up to 30 days.
Remove a device from any of your others, on its page, and it is cut off at once and for good: that device can never sign in to your account again, whichever Google account it brings. Someone who keeps a stolen device online keeps it checked in, which is why removal is there.
Everything is end-to-end encrypted
Each pair of devices shares an MLS group (RFC 9420), the IETF standard for messaging encryption, bound to the identities checked at pairing. Clipboard entries, file manifests, permissions and every session's set-up travel as MLS-encrypted records.
The connection itself is QUIC with TLS 1.3, authenticated to each device's key. Live audio, video and input are sealed frame by frame with ChaCha20-Poly1305 under a key made fresh for each session and sent inside MLS.
Files travel in chunks checked with BLAKE3 against hashes in the encrypted manifest, and a file only takes its real name once every chunk checks out.
A server that cannot read
On the same Wi-Fi your devices talk directly. Away from it they connect directly across the internet when they can, and otherwise meet through our relay, which passes along end-to-end encrypted traffic it holds no key for, and steps aside whenever a direct connection is possible. Nothing is uploaded anywhere for safekeeping.
The app reaches our server only at a key built into it, so nothing else can pose as it. The server keeps your Google account's identifier and email, and which devices are on your account; never a password, a Google token, a key, or anything that could read what your devices send. What Google gives the app at sign-in is made for that one device and is used once.
While UniConn is in beta it sends crash reports and usage counts, never what your devices share (see the privacy policy).
You approve every session
A permission only lets the other device ask. The phone's owner is asked every time its camera or screen is wanted, Android asks its own question for the screen, and a notification with Stop stays up for the whole session.
Control of the phone needs Android's accessibility access, which UniConn asks you to switch on for the session and which switches itself off seconds after control ends, so banking and UPI apps, which refuse to run beside an enabled accessibility service, keep working.
Revoking a permission ends a session using it at once. Terminal and unattended access are never granted when devices join.
Locked on each device
History, keys and pairings live in an encrypted database (SQLCipher) whose key is wrapped by the system: the Android Keystore on the phone, the Secret Service keyring on Linux, Credential Manager on Windows.
Erase UniConn on this device, in Settings, destroys that key, which makes the database unreadable. Paired devices are not told; to them this device simply stops answering.
What it does not promise yet
UniConn is in beta. Its code has been through a detailed audit, worked through finding by finding, but there has been no independent security review yet. A public beta waits on one.
It cannot protect a device that is already compromised, and it does not hide that two devices are talking from someone watching your network. Keep backups of anything that matters.
Report a vulnerability
Please report it privately, to support@uniconn.live. Do not include message content, keys or personal data in a report.
Check what you download
Every file’s SHA-256 is published here, and the Android app is signed with one key that never changes. Compare them before you install.
install.sh checks this hash for you.
install.sh checks this hash for you.
install.sh checks this hash for you.
Not code-signed yet: Windows asks before running it, and Smart App Control refuses it.
The Debian logo is the Debian Open Use Logo, CC BY-SA 3.0, by Software in the Public Interest. Ubuntu, Fedora and Arch Linux are trademarks of their owners, shown only to say which package is for which system.